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 1) Introduction  
Assessment of the impact of Quantitative Easing (QE) is a difficult task.  QE programs are 
both very unusual and very large.  They are only undertaken in times of severe economic 
difficulty and in circumstances when more conventional monetary policy cannot be used 
because the policy rate is at the zero lower bound.  This severely limits investigation of the 
effects of QE.  Studies can use contemporary high-frequency data from periods when QE is 
in operation, in which case data on some key macroeconomic variables, most especially 
output and inflation is not available; or else they can use data from periods when QE is not in 
operation, in which case they must assume that key macroeconomic relationships are not 
disrupted by the extraordinary events that led QE to be adopted.  Clearly, neither approach 
is ideal.   
 QE consists of large purchases of mainly longer-term government bonds and related 
assets.  Policymakers in the US and UK turned to QE in the hope that these purchases 
would reduce interest rates faced by households and firms and result in increased output 
and inflation.  The structure of this survey reflects this chain of causation.  We first review 
evidence on the impact of QE on government bond rates.  We consider evidence from the 
“QE1” and “QE2” programs as well as “Operation Twist” in the US and evidence from the UK 
“QE1”, “QE2” and “QE3” programs.  In doing so, we review the results of event studies and 
estimates of econometric models.  We then review evidence on the impact of QE on other 
assets prices such as corporate bond rates, equity yields, exchange rates and commodity 
prices.  Finally, we consider evidence on the impact of QE on the “real economy”, reviewing 
econometric studies of the impact of QE on output and inflation. 
We review empirical evidence on the impact of QE programs in the US and UK since 
2008.  We do not consider the impact of earlier episodes of QE, especially in Japan and do 
not consider interventions by the ECB since 2007, as these focussed on supporting short-
term money markets and so are different from the large scale asset purchases seen in the 
US and UK.  We do not consider alternative policies to address the economic crisis or 
political economy aspects of QE.  We do not address the causes of the financial crisis or the 
possible future shape of policy including macroprudential regulation.  
  
2) Evidence of the impact of QE on government bond rates 
2a) Event studies 
Event studies assume that all changes in the variable of interest that occur within a short 
time period are due to the event under consideration.  Most evidence comes from the US 
QE1 program.  The first stage of the program, $600bn purchases of housing agency debt 
and related securities, was announced on November 25th 2008 (although arguably the 
program was signalled in Chairman Bernanke’s Jackson’s Hole speech in late August). 
Following several indications of a likely increase in the size of the program, a major 
expansion of $1.15 trn comprising $850bn additional purchases of agency debt and $300bn 
longer-dated government bonds was announced on March 18th 2009.  Movements in the 
government bond rate in the days after these announcements have been taken as evidence 
of the impact of the program.  Three studies find that the program reduced 10-year 
government bond yields by around 100 basis points (bp), with the 18th March 2009 
announcement having a particularly large effect.  Gagnon et al (2011) report a reduction of 
91 basis points (bp), Glick and Leduc (2011) find an effect of around 100 bp and 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) report a reduction of 107 bp.   Another study, 
Meaning and Zhu (2011), reports a smaller but still sizeable effect of around 80 bp; they also 
report reductions of around 85bp in the 5-year bond rate.  
  The first round of QE in the UK, UK QE1, began gradually.  The body used for asset 
purchases, the Asset Purchase Facility Fund, was set up in January 2009 and some 
purchases of commercial bills occurred in February.  The Inflation Report news conference 
on Wednesday 11th February 2009 indicated that an asset purchase program was likely.   
On 5th March the MPC announced the purchase of £75bn assets; subsequent 
announcements on 7th May, 6th August and 5th November then increased the program to 
£125bn, £175bn and then £200bn.  Maintenance of the program at £200bn was announced 
in February 2010.  Of the £200bn purchases, £198bn were of government bonds, spread 
across a wide range of maturities.  Unlike US QE1, differing estimates of the impact of the 
program have been reported.   Joyce et al (2011) find an overall reduction of around 100bp 
in the 10-year government bond rate as a result of the program, with the largest effect 
coming after the announcement on 5th March.  Meier (2009) finds an effect of between 40-
100bp, arguing there is an “effect of QE on gilt yields of, at the very least, 35-60 basis 
points”.  By contrast, Glick and Leduc (2011) and Meaning and Zhu (2011) find smaller 
effects, close to 50bp.  This may reflect the fact that these latter papers use a 1-day window 
whereas Joyce et al (2011) use a 2-day window (and report a stronger response on the 
second day, Joyce et al, 2011, Chart 10).  The 50bp difference between these studies 
highlights the importance of window length in event studies: adding a single day doubles the 
estimated impact of UK QE1.   
The first indication of the US QE2 program was given on 10th August 2010 when the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announced it would roll-over holdings of Treasury 
securities as they matured, extending the life of the program by using redemption payments 
to purchase fresh assets.  Further statements led to the announcement on 3rd November 
2010 of $600bn purchases of long-dated government bonds. Evidence from event studies is 
mixed but with no indication of a large impact.  Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) 
report a reduction of 18bp in the 10-year government bond rate for a 1-day window and 30bp 
for a 2-day window, with smaller reductions in the 5- and 30-year rates.  Glick and Leduc 
(2011) find no effect on the 10-year rate while Meaning and Zhu (2011) report a slight 
increase in the 10-year and a slight fall in the 5-year rate.  The FOMC announced “Operation 
Twist” on 21st September 2011.  This was an attempt to flatten the yield curve by selling 
$400bn assets with a maturity of less than three years and using the proceeds to purchase 
assets with a maturity over 6 years.  The only event study on this, Meaning and Zhu (2011), 
finds this had a measurable but small impact, raising the 5-year rate but reducing the 10-
year rate.  This is consistent with evidence from a similar exercise in the early 1960s 
(Swanson 2011).   
The UK QE2 program of £75bn purchases of government bonds was announced on 
6th October 2011.  Meaning and Zhu (2011) report this did not reduce government bond 
rates, being associated with small increases in rates across the yield curve.  The UK QE3 
program of a further £50 bn purchases was announced on 9th February 2012.  We do a brief 
event study of the effects of this announcement. On 9th February, 20- 10- and 5-year (zero-
coupon) UK government bond rates were 3.43%, 2.40% and 1.11% respectively.  On Friday 
10th February, the day after the announcement, they were 3.36%, 2.45% and 1.01% 
respectively.  On Monday 13th February they were 3.37%, 2.29% and 0.99% respectively.  
An event study with a 1-day window implies UK QE3 reduced the 20-year rate by 7bp, 
increased the 10-year rate by 5bp and reduced the 5-year rate by 10bp.  A 2-day window 
implies UK QE3 reduced government bond rates, by 6bp, 11bp and 12bp respectively for 20-
, 10- and 5-year rates.  These are small effects.  The reductions increased slightly in the rest 
of February 2012, but this may well reflect the negotiations around the Greek bail-out and 
bond-swap. 
These event studies suggest that initial large scale asset purchases were effective in 
reducing government bond rates in the US and UK.  Given the scale of these programs (by 
the end of UK QE1 the Bank of England held nearly 30% of freely floating gilts) this is not 
surprising.  Perhaps more surprising is the lack of impact from later initiatives: we might have 
expected more from the $600bn spent on the US QE2 program.  But event studies are only 
informative about movements in bond rates within a narrow time frame, no more than 6-10 
days across a QE program of many months.  They do not address longer-term movements 
in bond rates.  Figure 1) (reproduced from Meaning and Zhu, 2011) depicts UK and US 
government bond rates in 2007-2011 with key QE-related events highlighted.  US 
government bond rates fell over the period of the US QE1 program, from close to 4% in the 
3rd quarter of 2008 to around 2% in early 2009.  Event studies suggest about half of this 
decline may have been due to QE1.  However bond rates then rose sharply, ending 2009 
close to their 2007 levels.  This may mean that QE has only a temporary, and swiftly 
unwound, effect on bond rates.  The fact that the most pronounced movements in US bond 
rates in this period occurred outside periods of QE, for example in the 3rd quarter of 2008, 
may indicate that other forces are more important.  But this decline may also reflect 
anticipation of a QE program; discussion of QE became widespread as the policy rate fell 
rapidly to its lower bound in the 3rd quarter; arguably the US QE1 program was widely 
expected and the only “news” in the initial announcement concerned the size of the program. 
The UK 10-year government bond rate also fell in the early months of the UK QE1 
program in February and March 2009, from 3.8% to close to 3%; anticipation of QE may 
have affected bond yields prior to this, especially after the launch of US QE four months 
earlier.  The 100 bp reduction estimated in the event study in Joyce et al (2011) suggests 
that the bond rate would have risen slightly in the absence of QE; the observed reduction is 
perhaps more consistent with the smaller 50bp reduction estimated in Meier (2008), Glick 
and Leduc (2011) and Meaning and Zhu (2011), with the marked fall around 5th March 
especially suggestive of an effect.  However, this reduction was soon reversed and bond 
rates at the end of the program were back to their levels of late 2008.  As in the US, the 
strongest movements in UK government bond rates occurred outside periods of QE 
programs.  In particular the periods leading up to bail-outs for Greece (May 2010 and July 
2011; the latter renegotiated in October 2011 and February 2012), Ireland (November 2010) 
and Portugal (May 2011) are associated with falls in UK and US government bond rates, 
clearly suggestive of a “flight-to-quality” around these events irrespective of the effects of 
QE.  Given that the scale of these bailouts was comparable to that of QE programs (close to 
€240bn for Greece, €85bn for Ireland and €78bn for Portugal), this is not a surprise.  This 
again raises the question of how much impact QE has on bond rates.  Event studies cannot 
hope to address these issues, so we next consider econometric evidence. 
 
Figure 1: Government bond yields in the US and the UK 
 
 
2b) Econometric studies 
QE programs are rare events that only happen in times of severe financial stress and 
economic turmoil.  As a result econometric investigation of QE requires difficult compromises 
that are reflected in the two types of econometric study of the impact of QE on bond yields.  
The first type uses data from periods when QE programs were in operation.  This enables 
direct investigation of these programs but is only feasible using daily or other high frequency 
data.  The need for high frequency data makes it difficult to control for variables such as 
inflation and output that might be expected to affect bond rates.   This problem is reduced in 
normal circumstances when the short-term interest rate set by policymakers reflects these 
factors.  However QE is not used in normal circumstances, only being used when the policy 
rate is at the zero lower bound and so unable to act as a high frequency sufficient statistic for 
developments in the real economy.  The inability to control for movements in inflation and 
output is a severe impediment for this type of study.  
The second type of econometric study of QE uses lower frequency historical data 
from before 2008, using a richer set of explanatory variables.  Typically, this approach 
studies the impact of changes in the stock of government bonds on bond rates in normal 
times.  By scaling-up responses to the relatively minor changes in the stock of bonds in the 
pre-crisis period to reflect the much greater movements observed during QE, some 
indication of the likely impact of QE may be obtained.  There are two apparent weaknesses 
with this approach.  First, it can indicate the likely impact of a generic QE initiative but not the 
impact of a specific QE program.  Second, and more seriously, it assumes that the 
relationships that drive bond rates in normal circumstances are not changed by the financial 
stress and economic turmoil that leads to QE being used or by the very large scale of QE 
programs.   These are both debatable assumptions. 
As with event studies, most evidence is available for the US QE1 program.  Taken 
together econometric estimates suggest the program did reduce government bond rates, 
especially 10-15 year rates.  However the effects are smaller and more diverse than those 
found in event studies.  Gagnon et al (2011) use historical monthly data for 1985-2008; they 
regress the 10-year Treasury bond yield and the 10-year yield term premium on official 
holdings of US Treasury debt (the amount of Treasury debt held by the US Treasury, the 
Federal Reserve and foreign governments and central banks) including the unemployment 
gap, core CPI inflation and interest rate volatility as controls.  They estimate that increased 
official holdings of Treasury debt reduces the term premium and hence drives down 
government bond rates.  Using these estimates to infer the impact of the $1.75 trn US QE1 
program, they obtain a reduction in the 10-year bond rate of between 38-82 bp depending 
on the dependent variable.  D’Amico and King (2010) use the contemporary data approach, 
using daily data for March 25 to October 30 2009 to estimate yield curve models. They 
regress the change in an asset’s yield since the start of the sample on US QE1 purchases of 
the asset and purchases of substitute assets, controlling for changes in the residual maturity 
of the asset.  Doing this for a range of assets they find significant reductions in bond yields 
across the yield curve with a largest effect of around 50 basis points on the 15-year bond 
rate, a slightly smaller effect on the 10-year rate but reductions of less than 20bp for 
durations of less than 5 years or over 25 years.   
Wright (2011) constructs measures of the “surprise” component of various US 
monetary policy announcements; he finds, for example, that the 25th November 2008 initial 
$600bn announcement of US QE1 is equivalent to a 80 bp cut in the policy rate while the 
major extension of US QE1 to $1.75trn announced on 18th March 2009 is equivalent to a 340 
bp reduction.  Glick and Leduc (2011) evaluate the impact of QE programs by regressing 
government bond yields on this measure using daily data.  For US QE1, they estimate a 
significant reduction in the 10-year bond rate.  However, since the estimates are expressed 
in terms of the effect of a 1-standard change in the monetary policy surprise, it is unclear 
what this implies for the size of the reduction in bond rates due to US QE1.  Szczerbowicz 
(2011) considers the different aspects of US QE1, allowing purchases of government bonds 
and mortgage backed securities (mbs) and agency debt to have different effects on the 10-
year rate.  She finds similar effects from both components of QE1, a reduction of 22 bp from 
government bond purchases and 17bp from purchases of mbs and agency debt.  Meaning 
and Zhu (2011) use a similar approach to D’Amico and King (2010).  For US QE1 they find 
an average reduction of 27 bp for bonds with maturities between 5-25 years.  However they 
only consider the effect of the $300bn purchase of government bonds; since these were less 
than 20% of the amount purchased, this is not an estimate of the impact of the whole 
program.  
Considering the UK QE1 program, Joyce et al (2011) estimate VAR and multivariate 
GARCH models using monthly historical data for the 1991-2007 period.  Using a portfolio 
balance approach and a VAR comprising returns on and portfolio shares of gilts, investment-
grade corporate bonds, equities and money as endogenous variables and inflation, industrial 
production and the slope of the yield curve as exogenous variables (this is a strong 
assumption since it rules out any impact of the various endogenous interest rates on output 
and inflation), they simulate the effects of QE by considering a shock that reduces the share 
of government bonds in private sector portfolios, calibrated to mimic the scale of UK QE1.  
They estimate this shock reduces yields on gilts by 85 bp.  However the impulse responses 
unwind rapidly and the effect after 6 months is reduced to 32 bp.  This rapid reduction in the 
estimated impact of QE might suggest some caution in interpreting impact studies that focus 
on immediate responses to announcements.  Using contemporary daily data and the same 
methodology as they used to assess US QE1, Glick and Leduc (2011) find that UK QE1 also 
led to a significant reduction in the 10-year bond rate, although the size of the effect is 
unclear.  Meaning and Zhu (2011) use contemporary daily data to estimate a model that 
lacks the rich dynamic responses of Joyce et al but which incorporates QE asset purchases 
more directly and also considers the impact on a wider range of government bonds.  They 
find that UK QE1 reduced government bond rates by 27bp, although the reduction for 10-15 
year bonds is larger, 75 bp.  The comparison between these papers highlights two important 
methodological issues.  The first is the importance of controls: Meaning and Zhu (2011) have 
a smaller set of controls and do not include the fiscal deficit; concern about the deficit in 
2009 may have affected UK bond yields in this period.  The second is the relative 
importance of the stock of bonds that is held versus the flow of bond purchases.  Joyce et al 
(2011) consider bond holdings whereas Meaning and Zhu (2011) consider the impact of 
bond purchases.  The former view implies persistent effects of QE purchases, whereas the 
latter suggests that the effects of QE are temporary and diminish as QE purchases cease 
(the implications are discussed further in Davies, 2011).  The stark contrast between the 100 
bp reduction in Joyce et al (2011) and the more modest 27bp reduction found by Meaning 
and Zhu (2011) led to much commentary (eg “Bank of England said to have over-estimated 
QE boost; The Financial Times, 11th December 2011), highlighting the political sensitivity 
around QE. 
Early analysis suggests that the impact of the US QE2 program may have had a 
smaller impact on bond yields, albeit a larger effect than found in event studies. Hamilton 
and Wu (2011) estimate a sophisticated model of bond pricing that incorporates a preferred 
habitat assumption into an affine arbitrage-free model to motivate an effect of the supply of 
bonds on prices; they find a reduction of 13 bp on average. Meaning and Zhu (2011) 
estimate a reduction of 21 bp across the yield curve (but a surprisingly large reduction of 
108bp for 20-year bonds). Szczerbowicz (2011) estimates a small and insignificant effect 
from US QE2, although the sample here is small. 
An interesting strand of work considers how QE in one country affected bond rates in 
other countries.  Neely (2011) analyses the impact of US QE1 on foreign 10-year 
government bond rates using daily data.  He finds a considerable impact on foreign bonds 
rates, with falls of 65, 78, 54, 50 and 19 bp in the UK, Australia, Canada, Germany and 
Japan, respectively.   Glick and Leduc (2011) find similar effects, although the effect on UK 
rates is smaller, at 45 bp.  These estimates suggest that the impact of US QE1 on UK bond 
yields was comparable to that of the UK’s own QE program and that US QE1 might explain a 
part of the fall in UK bond rates in late 2008.  Glick and Leduc (2011) find that UK QE1 had a 
muted impact on foreign bond rates with most effects in the low single digits.  Given the 
small scale of this program in global terms, this finding is not surprising.  They also find no 
effect of US QE2 on foreign bond rates, confirming the limited effect of that program.   
Summarising the evidence on the impact of QE on government bond rates, event 
studies find that the initial large scale asset purchase programs (US and UK QE1) did 
reduce government bond rates although estimates of the size of the effect vary.  
Econometric investigations tend to find smaller effects.  This may be because there is a 
strong initial response to announcements of QE programs which then unwinds over times, 
an effect that can be detected using econometrics but not event studies.  Econometric 
models estimated on historical data and used to infer the impact of QE estimate larger 
effects than do models estimated on contemporary data.  This may suggest that bond rates 
are less responsive to policy in periods of economic and financial turmoil, in which case 
estimates based on historical data should be treated with some caution.  The strong impact 
of US QE1 on overseas bond rates is also notable, suggesting that globally significant QE 
programs may have important spill-over effects.  The impact of subsequent programs (US 
and UK QE2 and Operation Twist) appears to be more modest.  There are several possible 
explanations of this.  These programs may have been expected by the markets and already 
affected bond rates through anticipation effects.  Or there may be have more rapid portfolio 
adjustment in response to the second round of QE, leading the effects of bond purchases to 
be transferred more rapidly onto the prices of other assets.  A more simple explanation might 
be that QE programs are more able to reduce bond rates when those rates are relatively 
high. Both US and UK QE1 programs were introduced when the 10-year bond rate 
exceeded 3%; when subsequent programs were introduced this rate was less than 3%; this 
might be tested in econometric studies by controlling for the bond rate at the start of the 
program (cf Breedon et al, 2012). 
 
3) Evidence of the impact of QE on other asset prices 
If the main objective of QE is to affect the real economy, the impact of QE programs 
on government bond rates is only part of a chain of causation that connects government 
bond rates, returns on other assets, aggregate demand and then output and inflation.  In this 
section we consider evidence on the second stage of this process; the impact of QE on 
corporate bond rates, money market rates, exchange rates and equity yields.   
As with studies on government bond rates, event studies suggest that QE has a 
sizeable impact on corporate bond rates.  Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) 
report a strong impact of US QE1 on corporate bond rates with reductions of 77bp for AAA 
bonds, 93bp for A, 60bp for BA and 43 bp for B.  Neely (2011) reports similar findings: a 
78bp reduction for BAA-rated corporate bonds.  Joyce et al (2011) report a smaller effect for 
UK QE1, a fall of around 50 bp, but only for higher quality assets at shorter durations.  
Econometric evidence is more mixed; the estimates of Joyce et al (2011) suggest that UK 
QE1 led to a reduction of 81bp in investment-grade corporate rates, falling to 32 bp after 6 
months.  This effect is similar to the effect estimated for government bond rates.  By 
contrast, the estimates of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) and Wright (2011) 
for US QE1 and QE2 find a much smaller effect.  This may be because Joyce et al use 
historical data whereas the other papers use contemporary data.   
There is little evidence of any impact of QE programs on money market rates.  Neely 
(2011) finds US QE1 had insignificant effects in the US and a range of other countries.  
Szczerbowicz (2011) finds no evidence that US QE1 or QE2 had any impact on the LIBOR-
OIS spreads, in contrast to the clear effect of earlier government bailouts and guarantee 
schemes.  Glick and Leduc (2011) and Neely (2011) consider the impact on US QE1 on 
exchange rates, concluding that it was associated with depreciations of the US dollar against 
major currencies in the range of 3-11%.  Glick and Leduc (2011) also find that US QE2 has a 
more negligible effect.   They also find a smaller effect associated with UK QE1 with 
depreciations of sterling in the range of 1.5-3.5%.  Joyce et al (2011) find much the same, 
noting that the slight fall in Sterling is much less than the 8% depreciation implied by a 
simple UIP calculation.  The relatively small impacts of US QE1 on exchange rates do not 
offset the marked impact of the program on foreign government bond rates; this suggests 
that a stimulus to economies overseas may be an important but unforeseen aspect of US 
QE1.  
There is less evidence on the impact of QE on other financial assets.  Joyce et al 
(2011) estimate the response of equity yields to UK QE1, falling by 282bp on impact and by 
120 bp after 6 months.  Glick and Leduc (2011) find that QE affects commodity prices, with 
US QE1 reducing commodity prices by 11% with the effects concentrated in energy-related 
commodities and precious metals; UK QE1 had a similar but smaller effect.  Finally, we note 
that QE does not appear to have affected interest rates facing SMEs and households, 
especially rates on unsecured borrowing.  UK evidence (from the database on the Bank of 
England website) suggests that effective interest rates on this type of borrowing increased in 
2008-9 as widening spreads outweighed the effects of lower policy  rates.   
 
4) Evidence of the impact of QE on the real economy 
This section considers the impact of QE programs on output and inflation.  Event 
studies are not feasible since these variables are only observed at monthly or lower 
frequencies.  Evidence comes from econometric studies using data largely drawn from 
before 2008.  We consider six studies (all from within Central Banks or first published as 
Central Bank Working Papers).  Three studies, Baumeister and Benati (2010), Lenza et al 
(2010) and Kapetanios et al (2012) share a similar methodology, with two others, Peersman 
(2011) and Bridges and Thomas (2012) sharing elements of the approach.  It is therefore 
worth considering the methodology in some detail. 
Consider the following simplified model:  
 
(1) 
0 1 1 + et t tY Y     
 
where ( , , , ) 't t t t tY y i s  is a (4x1) vector of endogenous variables, comprising measures of 
output (y), inflation (), the short-term policy rate (i) and the spread between the policy rate 
and a longer-term rate (s), et  is a (4x1) vector of error terms, 0  is a (4x1) parameter vector 
and 1  is a (4x4) parameter matrix, whose elements are 1
ij  for , { , , , }i j y i s .  There are 
four structural shocks, comprising an aggregate demand shock ( d ), an aggregate supply 
shock ( s ), a conventional monetary policy shock ( cmp ) and unconventional monetary 
policy shock ( ump ). The reduced form errors are related to the underlying structural shocks 
by the relationship  
 
(2)  Bt te   
 
where ( , , , ) 'd s cmp umpt t t t t      and B is a (4x4) matrix whose elements are 
,i jB  for 
{ , , , }i y i s .  and { , , , }j d s cmp ump .  The model is identified by a mixture of exclusion 
and sign restrictions on B.  In particular, the conventional monetary policy shock is defined 
as moving the policy rate and the spread in opposite directions while the unconventional 
monetary policy shock is defined as affecting the spread but not the policy rate.    
The effect of QE on output and inflation is then analysed: this is done by comparing 
forecasts of these variables obtained using this model with forecasts obtained from a 
counterfactual scenario in which QE did not occur.  The counterfactual forecast is 
constructed by fixing the spread at a value that, it is assumed, would have been observed in 
the absence of QE.  Baumeister and Benati (2010) assume that the spread would have been 
60bp higher in the US (using the mid-point of Gagnon et al’s, 2011, estimated reduction of 
38-82bp) and would have been 50bp higher in the UK (using Meier’s, 2010, estimate of a 35-
60 bp reduction).  Kapetanios et al (2012) assume that the spread would have been 100bp 
higher in the UK (using the reduction reported by Joyce et al, 2011).  Lenza et al (2010) 
assume that the spread would have remained fixed at the immediate pre-crisis level.   
 Baumeister and Benati (2010) use US quarterly data for 1954Q3-2008Q4 and UK 
quarterly data for 1955Q1-2008Q4 (they also estimate models for the Eurozone and Japan).  
They find that in the absence of QE, output growth would have fallen to -10% compared to 
an actual fall of 3% and that inflation would have been negative.  For the UK, they find that 
output growth would have fallen to -14% and inflation fallen to below -4%.  Clearly, these 
estimates suggest QE had a dramatic impact, saving the UK and US from economic 
catastrophe.  Are they plausible?  It is certainly arguable that policy interventions in late 2008 
and 2009 prevented a much worse outcome.  But QE was only part of a much wider series 
of interventions that included fiscal policy.  These other interventions are not included in the 
model so it is possible that the inferred impact of QE captures some of these other effects.  
The estimates also imply that QE had an immediate impact: for both the US and UK the 
largest impact of QE is felt in 2009Q1.  But UK QE1 did not begin until the middle of 2009Q1 
and US QE1 was only expanded from $600bn to $1.75 on March 18th 2009, near the end of 
the quarter in which QE is estimated to have its largest impact.  
Kapetanios et al (2012) use a similar approach to investigate the impact of UK QE1.  
They use three alternative models.  The first is a large-scale VAR estimated using monthly 
data for April 1993 to September 2011.  The model comprises 43 variables, reflecting real 
activity, prices and policy rates in the UK, US and the Eurozone).  This helps ensure a good 
forecasting performance but makes the model vulnerable to the critique that the many 
relationships built into the model might change as a result of the crisis.  The second model is 
a switching VAR with 4 regimes.  The VAR has 6 variables: output growth, inflation, M4 
growth, the 3 month TB rate, the spread between the 10-year bond rate and the 3-month 
Treasury Bill rate and growth in the FTSE all-share index.  Unlike Markov-style models, in 
this model the economy does not oscillate between regimes; rather it progresses from one 
regime to another over time.  This model is less vulnerable to changes in economic 
relationships, allowing the use of a longer time period, January 1963 to September 2011.  
However some regimes are short: for example, the final regime is estimated over the period 
of the financial crisis.  The final model is a VAR in which the parameters are allowed to 
change over time, evolving as random walks.  The VAR has 4 variables: output growth, 
inflation, the spread and the 3 month TB rate and is estimated using quarterly data over 
1968-2011.   This model is designed to overcome the problem of economic relationships that 
evolve over time; however it is vulnerable to sudden changes in these relationships, which 
may have occurred during the financial crisis. 
They find that UK QE1 increased output growth and inflation; summarising across 
models, GDP growth was 150-200 bp higher and inflation 75-150bp higher.  Impulse 
responses suggest the largest impact on output and inflation, 200bp and 150 bp 
respectively, occurred in March 2010, a month after the end of asset purchases was 
announced.  Given that UK GDP fell by 4.9% in 2009, these results imply that output would 
have fallen by close to 7% if there had been no QE.  Also CPI inflation would have been 
uncomfortably close to zero rather than its actual value of 2.1%.  In short these results 
suggest that QE saved the UK from a much deeper recession and the threat of deflation.  
Although these estimates are lower than found by Baumeister and Benati (2010) (and the 
timing of the maximal effect more plausible), it might be argued that these estimates are on 
the high side.  The assumption that QE lowered the spread by 100bp is questionable. As 
discussed above, most studies find a much smaller effect, close to 50 bp and most 
econometric estimates find an effect of less than 50 bp.  Perhaps a reduction of 50bp, 
following Baumeister and Benati (2010), might have been considered.  They also assume 
that the 100bp reduction applies across the yield curve: the evidence discussed above 
suggests there were smaller reductions in shorter–dated bonds.   
Lenza et al (2010) investigate the impact of conventional and unconventional 
monetary policy initiatives of the ECB using monthly data for January 1991 to August 2009.  
This is not a study of QE, since the ECB has not opted for large scale purchases of long-
dated financial assets.  Rather, it is a study of the effect of large-scale unconventional policy 
interventions in the short-term money market.  They use a large-scale VAR comprising 31 
variables covering various aspects of output, unemployment, prices, the money supply and 
policy and other interest rates in the Eurozone.  They analyse the impact of unconventional 
monetary policy on interest rate spreads and use this to infer the impact on the real 
economy. Their counterfactual scenario implies that unconventional monetary policy had a 
strong effect of short-term interest rates: for example the 3-month rate is assumed to be 
close to 3% in mid-2009 compared to an actual rate of less than 1%.  The estimated impact 
on output is initially negative, reducing output growth by up to 100bp; the effect become 
positive after mid-2009 and rises to a peak of 260bp by late 2009 before declining, 
disappearing after mid-2012.  The cumulative effect is positive.  The initial impact on inflation 
is persistently negative, only becoming positive by March-April 2011 by which time the effect 
is small.  The cumulative effect is negative.  The policy simulations suggest that the effect of 
the policy was transmitted via changes in interest rates spreads rather than through the 
money supply.  The results are mixed: the positive impact on output is offset by the finding 
that inflation was reduced; this is an odd finding for a policy that is assumed to have reduced 
interest rates by up to 200bp.  The finding of little change in the broad money supply is also 
a little odd: given the importance of bank lending in the Eurozone, one might have expected 
a positive impact on output to be reflected in a higher money supply.  
These studies all measure the impact of QE by assuming a counterfactual value for 
the interest rate spread that would have been observed in the absence of QE.  The 
counterfactuals that are used are open to the criticism: in particular, they assume that QE 
had a strong and lasting impact on government bond rates and hence on the spread.  The 
evidence surveyed above suggests that initial QE programs had a strong initial impact on 
bond rates but that subsequent programs had little effect.  Econometric evidence also 
suggests that even in the early programs, the strong initial impact was only-short lived.  By 
assuming a strong impact of QE on the spread throughout the period, these studies may be 
assuming QE had a stronger effect than it actually did (although it might be argued that 
Joyce et al (2011) under-estimate the impact of QE since they do not allow for anticipation 
effects).   
Bridges and Thomas (2012) analyse the impact of UK QE1 from a more explicitly 
monetarist perspective.  They argue that QE increased UK M4 by around £120bn or 8%.  
They analyse the impact of such an increase using an 8-variable VAR estimated using UK 
quarterly data for 1964Q1-2007Q3 and comprising the level of output, inflation, the real 
exchange, the money supply, stock prices, a short-term interest rate and the rate on 
government bonds.  There are eight shocks including conventional and unconventional 
monetary policy shocks, distinguished by the assumption that unconventional policy does 
not affect the short-term rate.  The effects of QE are simulated by choosing unconventional 
monetary policy shocks that result in a permanent 8% increase in the nominal money supply 
beginning in 2009Q1, setting the other shocks to zero.  Simulations suggest that QE reduced 
the bond rate spread by a maximum of 175bp by the start of 2010, a much larger effect than 
in other studies.  However this effect unwinds, becoming zero by mid-2011 and stabilising at 
a 50bp increase.  Equity prices increase by 200bp by early 2010; this effect then also 
unwinds and stabilises at a 50bp increase.  The nominal exchange rate depreciates but this 
effect is almost exactly offset by higher prices.  The response of output is more modest.  The 
level of output is projected to begin increasing in mid-2009 rising to a maximum effect of 
around 150bp by the start of 2010.  The effect then declines and becomes negligible by mid-
2011.  Inflation increases, but only from early 2010.  It reaches a peak of around 200bp 
before declining, although remaining above zero throughout the forecast period.  
As the authors acknowledge, these results assume that a model that is estimated 
using pre-crisis data and that is simulated using much larger shocks than occurred in the 
estimation period can deliver reliable insights in to the impact of QE.  The very strong 
response of asset prices, especially bond rates, is perhaps implausible in the light of other 
studies.  That said, the estimated response of output and inflation to QE seem more 
plausible than some of the larger effects obtained in some other studies. 
Peersman (2011) considers the impact of policy interventions on the monetary base 
and money multiplier and investigates transmission to the real economy via this route rather 
than via interest rate spreads. In contrast to the papers above, he assesses the impact of 
unconventional monetary policy by analysis of the impact of identified unconventional policy 
shocks rather than by comparison with a counterfactual no-intervention case.  Using monthly 
data for the Eurozone for 1991M1-2009M12, he analyses a VAR that includes industrial 
production as a proxy for output, the (CPI) price level, total credit, the monetary base, the 
interest rate on credit (an average of various private sector lending rates) and the policy rate.  
Conventional policy shocks have hump-shaped effects on output and inflation.  
Unconventional monetary policy shocks have similar effects, although these occur several 
months later.  This similarity leads Peersman (2011) to suggest that the two forms of 
monetary policy can to some extent be seen as substitutes in terms of their impact on the 
real economy, with an unconventional monetary policy shock that increases the monetary 
base by 10% having the same impact as a 25bp cut in the policy rate.  However there are 
differences in the transmission mechanism with conventional policy widening credit spreads 
and increasing the money multiplier and unconventional policy having the opposite effect.  
Chung et al (2011) use a different approach.  They estimate the reduction in 
government bond rates due to increased Fed holdings of government bonds as part of QE 
and simulate the impact of this reduction in bond rates using the large scale FRB/US 
macroeconomic model.  They assume that the impact of QE unwinds over time, from an 
initial reduction of 50bp that reduces to a 30bp reduction by late 2010 and a 10bp reduction 
by late 2012.  They find that US QE1 boosted GDP growth by almost 200bp with the 
strongest effect felt in early 2010 and that US QE2 increased GDP growth by around 100bp.  
The effect is similar to that of a 300bp reduction of the policy rate. 
Econometric estimates of the effects of QE programs on output and inflation (with the 
exception of Baumeister and Benati, 2011), are broadly similar.  QE increased GDP growth 
by around 1-3% with a similar effect on inflation.  This evidence suggests that QE has 
proved effective in limiting the scale of the downturn caused by the financial crisis that began 
in 2007.  However it suggests that QE, by itself, is not strong enough to spark an economic 
recovery.  Of course, this conclusion is tentative.  There is relatively little evidence on the 
effects of QE and most of this uses the same methodology. 
 5) Conclusions 
What have we learnt?  We have stressed the difficulty of assessing the impact of QE and the 
compromises forced on investigations of these issues.  Given this, we doubt it is possible to 
achieve any consensus on this. However, some consistent conclusions do emerge from our 
survey of the evidence.   
First, event studies suggest that initial large scale QE programs did succeed in 
lowering government bond rates, especially at the longer end of the yield curve.  However, 
econometric studies suggest that these effects may have been only temporary.  By contrast 
there is little evidence of subsequent QE programs having much effect.  This may be 
because they were introduced when bond rates were already quite low.  Or it may be 
because initial QE programs were sufficient to demonstrate the commitment of policymakers 
to addressing the financial crisis, leaving little for subsequent programs to add.  Second, QE 
appears to have been an effective response to the severe economic difficulties of late 2008 
and 2009, preventing even larger declines in output and inflation than were experienced.  
However, QE is a rather weak policy instrument; the very large initial asset purchase 
programs had effects comparable to a reduction of 200-300 bp in the policy rate; subsequent 
programs had little effect.  Third, (with one exception) studies of the impact of QE on the real 
economy use the same methodology.  Alternative estimates based on different models and 
methodologies would be useful in widening an evidence base that is currently too narrow. 
 As we approach the fifth anniversary of the first US QE programs in 2008, issues of 
how policymakers might unwind QE are likely to become more prominent.  Large scale sales 
of government bonds might threaten the stability of an already fragile market and lead to 
rapid increases in bond rates.  This suggests that reduction in the size of Central Bank 
balance sheets is likely to be done more gradually.  This may create difficulties for 
policymakers who may need to moderate or delay increases in the policy rate to absorb the 
effect of bond sales.  Given continuing uncertainties in the Eurozone and slow progress in 
reducing fiscal deficits, it may well be some years before QE begins to be reversed. 
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